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THE IMPLIED PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION AND THE
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT: A PRACTICAL
APPLICATION OF CORT v. ASH
JAMES D. CRAWFORDt
DEENA JO. SCHNEIDERft

I. INTRODUCTION

A

SIS SO OFTEN THE CASE when an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court appears to provide comprehensive
guidelines in an area of the law that has been the subject of conflict
or confusion, the decision in Cort v. Ash' did not eliminate the
questions faced by the various federal courts of appeals concerning
implied federal causes of action, but merely shifted their focus. As a
result, in the field of aviation law alone, the courts of appeals,
particularly the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
have faced an unprecedented number of cases questioning whether
2
such causes of action exist under various circumstances.
It was clear almost sixty years before the Cort decision that,
under some circumstances, a person who had suffered damages as a
result of the violation of a federal statute might have a right to sue
the violator even though the statute did not expressly create a
private cause of action. This doctrine of "implied" remedies received
the stamp of Supreme Court approval in the landmark case of Texas
& Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby,3 which arose under the Federal Safety
Appliance Acts. 4 The Rigsby Court stated that "[a] disregard of the
command of the statute is a wrongful act, and where it results in
damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted, the right to recover the damages from the party in default is
implied . . . ." Cases that followed Rigsby provided a variety of
t Member of the Pennsylvania bar; A.B. Haverford College, 1954; LL.B.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1962.
tt Member of the Pennsylvania bar; B.A. Yale University, 1971; J.D., Harvard
University, 1974.
The authors represented the appellants in Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc.,
548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976), which is among the cases discussed in their article.
1. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). See notes 9 & 16 and accompanying text infra.

2. See, e.g., Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976); Wolf
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915
(1977); Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975); see also
Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976).
3. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
4. Act of March 2, 1893, ch. 196, § 8, 27 Stat. 531, as amended by Act of March 2,
1903, ch. 976, § 32 Stat. 943, as amended by Act of April 14, 1910, ch. 160, 36 Stat. 298.
5. 241 U.S. at 39.

(657)
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tests6 to resolve the often difficult issue of whether under the facts of
a given case a particular federal statute created a private right of
7
action by implication.
Finally, in Cort v. Ash, a unanimous Eupreme Court, speaking
through Mr. Justice Brennan, undertook to harmonize the past six
decades of its decisional law. In declining to accept the plaintiff
shareholder's assertion that a private cause of action should be
inferred under a criminal provision prohibiting corporate campaign
contributions,8 the Court held:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a
statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant.
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit
the statute was enacted," - that is, does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintiffs? Second, is there any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiffs? And finally, is the cause of action
one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the
concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a
cause of action based solely on federal law? 9
The Supreme Court's delineation of the factors to be considered
in determining the existence of an implied federal cause of action
has brought about not the elimination of litigation, but the creation

6. For a discussion of some of these tests, see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. at 78-79,
82-83 n.14.
7. The importance of this question in many cases cannot be minimized. If the
asserted cause of action has no state analogue, or if relief is unavailable under the
analogous state cause, the answer will determine whether a plaintiff may have a
hearing at all on the facts relating to his complaint that he has suffered damages
from the violation of his federally protected rights. See, e.g., id. at 78. On many other
occasions, although some sort of relief may be available in state courts, the answer
will determine whether a plaintiff may have access to a federal forum for the
determination of federal rights or whether the outlines of those rights will be
measured by federal common law or by the common law of one or another of the
states. See, e.g., D'Arcy v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,282 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); Moody v. McDaniel, 190 F. Supp. 24, 28 (N.D. Miss. 1960).
8. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 723, as amended (repealed 1976).
Although the Court found no implied federal cause of action under this criminal
statute, it rejected the view, expressed in dissent in the court of appeals, "that where a
statute provides a penal remedy alone, it cannot be regarded as creating a right in
any particular class of people." 422 U.S. at 78-79. Nevertheless, the Court gave some
indication that a "bare" criminal statute, providing no other remedies, is unlikely to
give rise to a private cause of action. See id. at 79-80.
9. 422 U.S. at 78 (emphasis in original), quoting Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916) (citations omitted).
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- at least for a time - of additional exploration by the lower federal
courts. The difficult question of how the Cort factors are to be applied
remains, and the Supreme Court has yet to supply the lower federal
courts with much direction on the general approach to be used in
applying the factors or with many examples of their application in
the context of specific federal statutes.
On its face, the Cort formulation presents a number of fruitful
areas for analysis and discussion. Thus, for example, a careful
reader might raise a serious question as to whether the third Cort
factor is not merely a subcategory of the second. 10 Similarly, in this
day of multipart omnibus acts, it is important to know whether the
Supreme Court meant to create a test to be applied on a statute-wide
basis or merely to each individual provision of a statute, so that
some sections of the same statute might create an implied cause of
action while others would not.11 Rather than deal with questions
such as these in the abstract, it may be helpful to focus on the
application of the Cort factors to a single statute, though not a single
section of that statute, in the hope that such a limited analysis will
develop analytical techniques equally applicable to other cases and
other statutes. Accordingly, this article will examine the factors
against the backdrop of the Federal Aviation Act (Act),12 and will
analyze the various federal decisions which have discussed the
appropriateness of implying a private right of action for violations
of various provisions in that Act. Finally, this article will attempt to
draw from these decisions under this statute a more useful approach
to the application of the Cort criteria in this and other fields.
II. THE Cort

CRITERIA AS APPLIED TO THE FEDERAL
AVIATION ACT: THE EXISTING CASES

There are several basic types of cases in which the question of
the appropriateness of a private action under the Federal Aviation
Act has been raised: actions alleging discrimination in ticketing or

10. It might be appropriate to argue that the inconsistency of a private cause of
action with the legislative scheme is strong evidence of at least an implied legislative
intent not to create such a remedy. See note 83 and accompanying text infra.
11. The lower federal courts have consistently considered the sections of the
Federal Aviation Act on an individual basis when determining whether to imply a
federal cause of action. See, e.g., the cases listed in note 14 infra.
12. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). This legislation is also known
as the Federal Aviation Program which, inter alia, authorized the continuation and
enumerates the duties of the Civil Aeronautics Board. E.g., id. §§ 1321-1325. The Act
also established the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), id. § 1341, and delineates
powers and duties of the FAA Administrator. E.g., id. §§ 1342-1357, 1421-1432.
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overbooking and subsequent "bumping"; 13 actions alleging overcharges by airlines or claims that services for which the plaintiffs
have paid have not been provided; 14 and actions claiming violations
of safety provisions of the Act or of regulations promulgated under
the safety provisions.' 5 For the most part, the varying results in
these cases can be rationalized by an examination of the various
Cort factors in the context of the differing provisions of the Act.
A.

The First Factor - Whether the Act Creates a
Federal Right in Favor of the Plaintiffs

Looking to the actual statutory scheme involved in Cort, Mr.
Justice Brennan noted:
[I]n those situations in which we have inferred a private
cause of action not expressly provided, there has generally been

13. See, e.g., Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852
(1976) (no private remedy exists under the Act's antidiscrimination provision for
wife's derivative claim of emotional distress); Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512
F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976) (private cause of
action exists under antidiscrimination provision to remedy violations by air carrier of
its own nondiscriminatory rules determining priority in boarding); Fitzgerald v. Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) (no actionable civil right
providing basis for federal question jurisdiction exists to remedy violation of
antidiscrimination provision).
14. See, e.g., Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977) (airline passengers forced to forfeit free guest accommodations may not bring private federal action under § 403(b) of the Act, which prohibits
regulated airlines from charging fares inconsistent with those established by tariff, or
under § 411 of the Act, which prohibits deceptive practices); Polansky v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975) (airline passengers furnished inferior ground
accommodations may not bring private federal action under § 411 of the Act); Bratton
v. Shiffrin, 440 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (charter tour participants and travel
agencies seeking to recover deposits from bank in which deposits were escrowed and
bankrupt tour operator and organizers may not bring private federal action under
§ 401(n)(2) of the Act and regulations promulgated thereunder to insure financial
responsibility of tour operators); Vandrey v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 14 Av. Cas.
(CCH) 17,788 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (airline passengers denied reduced ticket charges may
not bring private federal action under §§ 403(b), 404(a) or 411 of the Act).
15. See, e.g., Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976) (no
private cause of action exists for damages on behalf of aircraft owners required to
repair defective altimeter to conform with FAA directive); Snuggs v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 13 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,631 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (state wrongful death action is not
removable to federal court under theory of implied federal cause of action); D'Arcy v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,282 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (allegations in
complaint of violations of regulations promulgated under the Act in aviation disaster
are not sufficient to remove case to federal court); Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F.
Supp. 612 (C.D. Cal. 1972) (private cause of action exists in favor of person injured or
damaged as a result of a violation of duty of care imposed by the Act and regulations);
Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681 (D. Colo. 1969) (no private federal
cause of action for tort liability exists under § 101(26) of the Act); Yelenik v. Worley,
284 F. Supp. 679 (E.D. Va. 1968) (no private federal cause of action for damages due to
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a clearly articulated federal right in the plaintiff, e.g., Bivens v.
Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, .. ., or a pervasive
legislative scheme governing the relationship between the
plaintiff class and the defendant class in a particular regard,
e.g., J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,... 16
In a sense, the standard suggested by the decision in Borak may
be viewed as an example of that suggested by the Bivens decision;
the legislative scheme governing the relationship between the
parties will be considered pervasive in a particular regard if it is so
comprehensive in scope that it clearly indicates that the plaintiff has
a right capable of being vindicated or, in other words, if the plaintiff
has a "clearly articulated federal right." Both formulations require
careful scrutiny of the statute in question to determine whether the
plaintiff is suing in his capacity as an individual intended to be
protected by the statute against the type of harm he alleges has
occurred. As the following review of the Federal Aviation Act cases
reveals, the test is thus very similar to that used to determine
whether a violation of a particular statute constitutes negligence per
7
se.1
1. Discriminationand Bumping Cases
Where discrimination in ticketing or overbooking and consequent discriminatory bumping have been alleged, plaintiffs have
generally been allowed to maintain their actions in the federal
courts' 8 since the Act explicitly creates a "public right of freedom of
transit through navigable airspace of the United States"'19 and
states that no carrier shall "subject any particular person.., in air
transportation to any unjust discrimination or any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever."20

personal injury exists under § 1 of the Act); Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D.
Wis. 1966) (no civil remedy exists under safety provisions of the Act); Moody v.
McDaniel, 190 F. Supp. 24 (N.D. Miss. 1960) (no private federal cause of action exists
in favor of survivor of deceased killed in accident allegedly resulting from violation of
regulations promulgated under the Act).
16. 422 U.S. at 82, citing 403 U.S. 388 (1970) and 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
17. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §874A, Comment f at 75-76 (Tent.
Draft No. 22, 1976); see also Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452, 459 (3d
Cir. 1976).
18. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 229
F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
19. 49 U.S.C. § 1304 (1970).
20. Id. § 1374(b).
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However, the cases under the Act also make clear that not all
injuries caused by airline discrimination will give rise to a private
right of action on the part of the injured individual. In Nader v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,21 the nonprofit organization for which
Ralph Nader was raising funds when he was bumped was not
allowed to press any claim, state or federal, for damages incurred
due to Nader's failure to arrive in time to appear at a rally because
the organization was deemed too "remote from the transaction" to
fall "within the class of persons who may recover. '22
Similarly, in Mason v. Belieu, 23 the plaintiff was not allowed to
recover for the mental distress she suffered when her husband, who
had purchased a flight ticket, was refused passage and failed to
arrive on his scheduled flight. 24 The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit noted:
This attempt to protect all persons from unjust practices,
however, does not mean that all injuries traceable by some direct
line of causation to airline discrimination, no matter how distant
or minute, are compensable under section 404. Not only must
nonpassengers be included within the class of persons covered
by the Act, but the injury for which they seek recovery must be
an interest protected by the statute ....
The unjustified refusal of the airline to allow Mr. Mason to
use his ticket for Flight 585 affected Mrs. Mason only indirectly
since she was not personally denied access to Pan American
services or facilities. Although the trial court held that her
mental distress was "directly and foreseeably" caused by this
action, this tort concept of causation does not bring Mrs.
Mason's injury - distress because someone else was denied
transportation - within the class of interests sought to be

protected by the statute ....

We hold that such derivative

claims are not actionable under the antidiscrimination clause. 25

2.

Breach of Contract Cases

In contrast, the courts have been hesitant to imply a private
right of action in breach of contract and overcharging cases
probably in large part because of the first Cort factor. It is difficult to
perceive any clear federal right of passengers to receive what they

21. 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976).

22. 512 F.2d at 549.
23. 543 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976).
24. 543 F.2d at 222.
25. Id. at 219-20 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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contract to receive from the airline or what they are entitled to under
the tariff - the airline's rate schedule filed with the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB).26 Thus in Polansky v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc.,2 7 the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit refused to imply a private right of action under section 404(b)
of the Federal Aviation Act, 28 the same statutory section generally
invoked in the discrimination and bumping cases, 29 for what was
termed "misconduct which amounts (at the most) to nothing more
than a breach of contract, 'misrepresentation' or breach of warranty."30 While the plaintiffs were passengers who had allegedly been
misled about the accommodations they were to receive on the tour
being run by the airline, and were thus "members of the proper
.class," the court held that they "did not suffer the harm the statute
'3 1
was designed to prevent.
As might have been expected after its decision in Polansky, the
Third Circuit in Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,32 held that
section 403(b) of the Act, forbidding charges differing from those
specified in the tariff, 33 did not authorize private suits by allegedly
aggrieved passengers. 34 The Wolf court reasoned that the statute
was not intended to protect those passengers, but was rather
"designed to empower the CAB to control the supposedly pernicious
competitive activities that were the target of the Federal Aviation
Act."' 35 Similarly, in Vandrey v. Lufthansa German Airlines,36 the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
refused to imply a private right of action under section 403(a), which
prohibits fares that "unduly prefer or prejudice" other air carriers, 37

26. See 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970); note 12 supra; note 32 infra.

27. 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975).
28. Section 404(b) provides in pertinent part: "No air carrier or foreign air carrier
shall make, give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any
particular person... in any respect whatsoever or subject any particular person...
to any unjust discrimination or any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage

in any respect whatsoever." 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) (1970).
29. See cases cited in note 13 supra.

30. 523 F.2d at 338.
31. Id. at 335.
32. 544 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977).
33. Section 403(b) provides in pertinent part:

No air carrier or foreign air carrier or any ticket agent shall charge or demand or
collect or receive a greater or less or different compensation for air transportation, or for any service in connection therewith, than the rates, fares, and
charges specified in then currently effective tariffs of such air carrier or foreign
air carrier . ...

49 U.S.C. § 1373(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
34. 544 F.2d at 137-38.
35. Id. at 137.
36. 14 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,788 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
37. 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1970).
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in favor of plaintiff passengers claiming a right to be refunded the
difference between the fare applicable when they purchased their
tickets and a later, lower fare which became effective prior to their
departure date. 38 The reason given by the court was that the "clear
implication" of the statute was that "a fare that is too low would be
unreasonable to other participating air carriers, yet would not be
challenged by the passengers who paid the lower fare" and thus the
statute was designed to benefit other airlines and not passengers.3 9
3.

Safety Cases

The cases involving the safety provisions of the Act4° are not as
easy to harmonize. At present there is a disagreement as to whether
those injured as a result of violations of these provisions may have a
federal cause of action, with the majority view apparently against
41
the implication of such a right.
As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
noted in Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 42 in a broad sense the
safety provisions seek to assure "the personal safety of all persons
who are potential passengers or crew members of civil and military
aircraft as well as those others on the ground whose lives or property
might be endangered by accidents resulting from unsafe aircraft or
other unsafe flying conditions. ' 43 The Rauch determination that

38. 14 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,789.
39. Id. The court may also have been influenced by the fact that the type of ticket
purchased by the plaintiffs was required to be purchased two calendar months in
advance of travel, while the new fare went into effect only four days before their
actual departure date. See id. at 17,789 n.1. Similarly, in Bratton v. Shiffrin, 440 F.
Supp. 1257, 1262 (N.D. Ill. 1977), the court distinguished between plaintiff travel
agencies and individual tour participants, holding that the former clearly were not
within the class of "travelers" for whose benefit § 401(n)(2) of the Act was enacted.
The court then went on to conclude that the other Cort factors all indicated that no
private right of action was warranted even on behalf of the tour participants. See
notes 70, 77 infra.
40. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1432 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
41. Compare McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129, 1131 (10th Cir. 1971);
Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1393 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Snuggs v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 13 Av. Cas. (CCH)
17,631, 17,632 (S.D. Fla. 1974); D'Arcy v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,282
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681, 683 (D. Colo.
1969); Yelenik v. Worley, 284 F. Supp. 679, 681 (E.D. Va. 1968); Moungey v. Brandt,
250 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Porter v. Southeastern Aviation, Inc., 191 F.
Supp. 42, 43 (M.D. Tenn. 1961); Mozingo v. Consolidated Constr. Co., 171 F. Supp. 396,
398 (E.D. Va. 1959), with In re Paris Air Crash of March 3, 1974, 399 F. Supp. 732,
747-48 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Gabel v. Hughes Air Corp., 350 F. Supp. 612, 615 (C.D. Cal.
1972); Neiswonger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 35 F.2d 761, 762 (N.D. Ohio 1929).
42. 548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976). See notes 51-57, 92 & 108-12 and accompanying
text infra.
43. 548 F.2d at 457.
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potential air crash victims come within the class of beneficiaries of
the safety provisions of the Federal Aviation Act seems eminently
sound. It is hard to imagine any court refusing to hold that the
passengers and crew of a plane that crashed because of failure to
comply with safety regulations under the Act were not members "of
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted" or
denying that, in abstract terms, the first Cort factor, at least, would
44
support the implication of a federal right in their favor.
By contrast, the reasoning of other courts that have sought to
deny federal relief to the actual victims of air crashes alleged to have
resulted from failure to comply with the safety provisions of the Act
is somewhat strained. Nevertheless, there are a few cases which
explicitly hold that the safety provisions, and the regulations
promulgated under them, do not in and of themselves create a
federal right in potential or actual passengers to be free of accidents
in the air but rather serve merely as a discretionary guide to defining
the proper standard of care applicable in the traditional common law
causes of action arising out of such accidents. 45 A number of other
cases denying federal rights of action can be seen as resting on this
46
ground.
There is even a slight suggestion that the Supreme Court is
leaning in the latter direction. In its decision last term in Miree v.
DeKalb County,47 the Court refused to create federal common law to
govern the question whether private parties could sue a municipality
as third party beneficiaries of its contract with the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), when breach of the contract was alleged to
have caused the accident in question. 48 Miree was a diversity case in
which the court of appeals had turned to federal common law not to
find the basis for a claim but to avoid the plaintiffs' state law right
to sue as third party beneficiaries under a contract between the

44. On the other hand, the availability of an exceptionally adequate state law
remedy may provide the justification for the denial of an implied federal cause of
action even to the actual accident victim. See also note 99 and accompanying text
infra.
45. See, e.g., D'Arcy v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,282 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (regulations promulgated under the Act help to define standard of care but do
not provide ground on which to base claim resulting from aviation disaster); Moody v.
McDaniel, 190 F. Supp. 24, 28 (N.D. Miss. 1960) (Act and regulations did not create
federal cause of action in wrongful death case arising out of airplane accident).
46. See, e.g., McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1971);
Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv., Inc., 435 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Snuggs v. Eastern Airlines, 13 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,631 (S.D. Fla.
1974).
47. 433 U.S. 25 (1977).
48. Id. at 26, 32.
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county and the FAA. The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that
"any federal interest in the outcome of the question [was] 'far too
speculative . . . to justify the application of federal law to
transactions essentially of local concern.' "49 It is conceivable that
under this reasoning the Court might hold that the federal interest
in air safety in general is insufficient to federalize tort and warranty
liability of aircraft manufacturers, owners, and operators even when
accident victims are involved50
However the law may develop with respect to the existence of a
federal remedy in favor of accident victims, it is clear that a private
remedy is not likely to be implied when the injury did not arise from
an actual accident caused by violation of the safety provisions of the
Act. For example, in Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc.,5 1 the Third
Circuit held that the Act does not permit aircraft owners to recover
from the manufacturer and distributor of an allegedly defective
altimeter the cost of permitting a repair to the instrument in
compliance with an FAA directive. 52 The plaintiffs had alleged that
the FAA had ordered the altimeter to be repaired because it was
inherently unsafe. 53 Although the Third Circuit in Rauch clearly
recognized airline passengers and crew members as special beneficiaries of the Act, 54 the court also noted:
It does not follow, of course, that upon a violation of the Act
or the regulations with respect to aircraft safety every potential
passenger or crew member of the affected aircraft has an implied
cause of action for damages under the Act. For an essential
element of such a cause of action, expressed or implied, is injury
resulting from such a statutory violation which has been
inflicted upon the plaintiff in his capacity as a member of the
protected class and which has caused him measurable damage. 55

49. Id. at 32-33, quoting Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352

U.S. 29, 33-34 (1956).
50. The petitioners in Miree sought to make affirmative use of the issue of an
implied federal right only when the case reached the Supreme Court. 433 U.S. at
33-34. For this reason, the Court did not consider this argument as a basis of
upholding plaintiffs' right to sue. Id. However, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
Court, did state in passing that "[t]he fact that this asserted basis of liability is so
obviously an afterthought may be some indication of its merit. . . ." Id. at 33-34. See
Snuggs v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 13.Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,631 (S.D. Fla. 1975).
51. See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra; notes 92 & 108-12 and
accompanying text infra.
52. 548 F.2d at 454.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 457.
55. Id.
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Without resolving the question of the right of accident victims to
recover under federal law, the Rauch court distinguished between
actual victims of aircraft accidents that occurred as a result of
violations of safety regulations and potential aircrash victims who
are also owners of aircraft and who seek recovery for economic
losses suffered in performing their statutory duties of complying
with the Act's safety provisions. 56 The court had little difficulty in
finding a lack of congressional concern for the economic expense
incurred by the owners, noting that prevention of injury before it
occurred was the principal purpose of the Act and that this had been
accomplished when the allegedly unsafe altimeters were corrected in
accordance with the FAA directive5 7
Thus, in almost every case, the first Cort factor gives clear and
significant aid in determining whether a private federal cause of
action should be implied under the Federal Aviation Act.
B.

The Second Factor - Whether Congress Intended
To Create a Federal Right of Action as
a Means of Enforcing the Act

The legislative history of a particular statute rarely contains a
definitive indication as to congressional intent, either explicit or
implicit, to create or deny a federal remedy. Typically courts have
determined legislative intent only from consideration of the other
Cort factors. For example, where a clear federal right is granted the
plaintiff in the statute, an intent to imply a remedy to enforce that
right generally is implied. 58 On the other hand, where the statute
expressly provides a particular remedy, a presumption against
intent to provide other remedies is created.5 9 Similarly, an intent to
provide a remedy is not implied where it is not necessary to

56. Id. at 457-58.
57. Id. at 458-59.
58. See Texas v. Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1916). This reasoning is
consistent with the maxim of statutory construction, ubi jus, ibi remedium, which
suggests that if the legislation created a right, it must have created a remedy to
enforce it.
59. See T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 471 (1969) (significant
omissions in Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-327 (1970) negate implication of
shippers' right of reparation with respect to allegedly unreasonable tariff rates
formerly effective). This reasoning is consistent with the maxim of statutory
construction, expressio unius, exclusio alterius eat, suggesting that if one remedy is
provided, the legislature intended to exclude other remedies, and, in addition, that if
one section of a statute calls for civil liability and the other does not, the legislature
must have intended no civil liability under the second section.
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effectuate the purposes of the statute or where adequate remedies
already exist.60
These general principles can be applied to the Federal Aviation
Act with only limited success.6 1 They work best in the discrimination
and bumping cases, where there is a clear federal right involved. 62
Regarding the breach of contract and overcharging cases, there is
little evidence in the legislative history whether a private remedy
was intended to be created. 63 The more honest approach would
appear to be to give little weight to legislative history in these cases
and to concentrate on the other Cort factors more capable of
64
reasoned analysis.
The majority of the cases under the safety provisions of the Act
have held that a private action was neither intended nor envisioned
by Congress as a means of enforcement of these provisions. 65 In
1969, Congress considered - but did not pass - a bill to provide for
a federal cause of action for injuries arising out of aircraft
disasters. 66 The fact that the bill was not passed could be read to
indicate a congressional decision not to imply a private action for at
least this class of cases. 67 However, many of the courts ruling on the

60. See Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453, 462-64, rehearing denied, 415 U.S. 952 (1974) (§ 307 of Amtrak Act, 45 U.S.C.
§ 547 (1970), does not permit private lawsuits to prevent train route discontinuance
since those lawsuits would interfere with proceedings in administrative forums).
61. For a case applying the first of these principles, see Fitzgerald v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1956). For the application of the second
principle, see Caribbean Atl. Airlines v. Leeward Islands Air Transp., 269 F. Supp.
231, 233-34 (D.P.R. 1967), cited with approval in Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v.
CAB, 392 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1968). For the application of the third principle, see
Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1975); Moungey v. Brandt, 250
F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
62. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
63. See Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215, 221 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852
(1976); Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 336 (3d Cir. 1975).
64. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 874A, Comment c at 73-74 (Tent.
Draft No. 22, 1976). As the Supreme Court recently noted in refusing to imply a
private right of action in favor of a defeated tender offer or under Section 14(e) of the
Securities Exchange Act as added by the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e), "We must
be wary against interpolating our notions of policy in the interstices of legislative
provisions." Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 26 (1977), quoting
Scripps-Howard Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4, 11 (1942).
65. See, e.g., McCord v. Dixie Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129,1131 (10th Cir. 1971);
Rogers v. Ray Gardner Flying Serv. Inc., 435 F.2d 1389, 1393 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Snuggs v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 13 Av. Cas. (CCH)
17,631, 17,632 (S.D. Fla. 1975); D'Arcy v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. (CCH) 18,282
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681, 683 (D. Colo.
1969); Yelenik v. Morley, 284 F. Supp. 679, 681 (E.D. Va. 1968); Moungey v. Brandt,
250 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
66. See Aircraft Crash Litigation Hearings before Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery, on S. 961, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 202-211 (1969).
67. See Miree v. DeKalb County', 433 U.S. 25, 32 (1977).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss4/2

12

Crawford and Schneider: The Implied Private Cause of Action and the Federal Aviation Act:

1977-1978]

THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT

question of congressional intent vis-4-vis a private right of action
under the Federal Aviation Act for air accident victims appear to
have reached their conclusions less from their view of legislative
history than from the application of the other Cort factors. 68 Thus, it
might be preferable simply to give the other Cort factors increased
weight in cases arising under the safety provisions of the Act as well
as in breach of contract cases.
C.

The Third Factor - Whether a Federal Right of Action
Would Be Consistent With the Underlying
Purposes of the Legislative Scheme

According to Cort, no indication in the legislative history of
congressional intent to grant or withhold a private remedy for
violations of a statute is necessary to determine whether the
implication of such a remedy would be consistent with the legislative
scheme.6 9 Rather, the force of the third factor delineated by the
Supreme Court depends on such considerations as whether the
remedy would further the purpose of the statute in question, 70
whether existing remedies are adequate to enforce the federal
interest involved, 7 1 and whether the remedy to be implied would
conflict with the statutory scheme.7 2 The application of these
considerations to the various types of cases arising under the

68. See, e.g., Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966). See also text
accompanying notes 79-80 infra.
69. 422 U.S. at 82.
70. See Pofansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1975). It
could in fact be argued that two recent Supreme Court cases have modified the third
Cort factor to mean that a private right of action, "should not be implied where it is
'unnecessary to ensure the fulfillment of Congress' purposes' in adopting the Act." See
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477 (1977) quoting Piper v. ChrisCraft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977). For a specific application of these cases to
a provision of the federal Aviation Act, see Bratton v. Shiffrin, 440 F. Supp. 1257, 1264
(N.D. Ill. 1977), in which the court stated:
Where a government agency can provide private parties with the relief
necessary to effectuate the congressional purposes, where there is no express
provision for a private remedy and the legislative history is bereft of any
indication that such a remedy should be implied, courts should be hesitant to add
to the burden of the judicial system. Particularly in a case such as this where the
C.A.B. has filed an action against the defendants to enjoin further violations of
the Act and recover the deposits made by the private plaintiffs, it is unnecessary
to imply a private remedy to protect the interests of the plaintiff class.
71. See Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
72. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421 (1975);
National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,
464, rehearingdenied, 415 U.S. 952 (1974); Calhoun v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140-41
(1964).
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Federal Aviation Act provides a fair prediction as to whether a
73
private remedy will be implied.
For example, in the discrimination and bumping cases, the
federal cause of action is necessary to afford the plaintiff the
opportunity to redress the harm he has suffered, which may not be
directly cognizable under the common law.7 4 On the other hand,
claims for damages ancillary to the denial of access to the airspace,
being somewhat removed from the major aims of the Act, do not
75
require vindication as a matter of federal law.
Similarly, in the breach of contract and overcharging cases, the
courts have noted that while the Act does not encourage airlines not
to perform services as contracted, "protecting passengers from
inadequate services would in no way foster the statutory goal" of
insuring free access to airspace. 76 This conclusion seems particularly
correct because the CAB has the duty to administer the Act and can
77
monitor compliance with tariffs.
As for the cases arising under the safety provisions of the Act,
several courts have recognized that the federal government's air
safety program would not be improved by the implication of the
79
federal tort remedy. 78 As noted in Moungey v. Brandt:
The national interest in safety in civil aeronautics is
adequately protected by the network of statutory and administrative procedures and sanctions expressly created by the
Federal Aviation Program, as outlined above. No persuasive
reason suggests itself why the efficacy of the Program need be

73. Of course, some of these same considerations may help to indicate explicit
legislative intent, which is often dispositive of the ultimate question whether or not to
imply the federal remedy. See, e.g., Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,
421 U.S. 412, 421 (1975); National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 464, rehearing denied, 415 U.S. 952 (1974).
74. See Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 338 (3d Cir. 1975).
75. See Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215, 221 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852
(1976).
76. See, e.g., Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir.
1975).
77. See note 26 supra;Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977). Even where the statutory goal is to protect
passengers from financially irresponsible tour operators, as is the case with § 401(n)(2)
of the Act, the fact that "[tihe C.A.B. has explicit authority to enforce the statute and
regulations at issue, and to seek an injunction against any further violations... [and
to] obtain an order for refunds of the plaintiffs' tour deposits" was sufficient reason to
refuse to imply a private federal remedy in the plaintiffs' favor. Bratton v. Shiffrin,
440 F. Supp. 1257, 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1977). See note 83 infra.
78. See, e.g., Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D. Wis. 1966), quoted
with approval in Yelenik v. Worley, 284 F. Supp. 679, 681 (E.D. Va. 1968).
79. 250 F. Supp. 445 (W.D. Wis. 1966).
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fortified by the creation, by implication, of a civil remedy in the
federal court.80
It is clear that the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Program
has great authority to regulate the use of all navigable airspace in
the United States, 81 and administrative remedies should suffice. s2 In
fact, it could be argued that a private remedy would interfere with
the legislative intent to centralize in a single agency the authority to
promulgate and enforce rules relating to the safe use of airspace"8
and thus is inconsistent with the legislative scheme.
D.

The Fourth Factor - Whether the Cause of Action Is One
Traditionally Relegated to State Law

In the eyes of many courts, the fourth Cort factor is especially
significant because of the philosophical underpinnings of our system
of federalism, which presupposes that those matters that are local in
nature should be dealt with by local authorities. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated: "Only where there
is some countervailing national interest should the federal courts
imply a federal private remedy when an adequate state remedy
already exists. ' s4 The difficulty of satisfying this test and the degree
to which this factor overlaps with the other Cort factors are evident.
Consider, for example, the discrimination and bumping cases
brought under the Federal Aviation Act, which arise out of a
80. Id. at 451.
81. See United States v. Christensen, 419 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1969); Air Line
Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 894 (2d Cir. 1960); Lee v. United States,
261 F. Supp. 252, 257 (C.D. Cal. 1966); 49 U.S.C. §§ 1471, 1487(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975);
note 12 supra. The Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce recommended
that the Administrator be given plenary power to:
(a) Allocate airspace and control its use by both civil and military aircraft;
(b) Make and enforce air traffic rules for both civil and military aircraft;
(c) Develop and operate a common system of air navigation facilities for both
civil and military aircraft;
(d) Make and enforce safety regulations governing the design and operation of
civil aircraft.
H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2 (1958), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3741, 3742 (1958).
82. See Luedtke v. County of Milwaukee, 521 F.2d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1975); Eisman
v. Pan Am. World Airlines, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 543, 554 (E.D. Pa. 1971). For example,
the Act provides that an individual may file a complaint with the FAA. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 1482(a) (1970). Nor do practical limitations such as an agency's lack of resources to
take action on every complaint filed outweigh the fact that the agency has the power
to act to enforce the law when it deems this to be necessary. See Piper v. Chris-Craft
Industires, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41 (1977); Bratton v. Shiffrin, 440 F. Supp. 1257, 1264 (N.D.
Ill. 1977).
83. See Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412, 421 (1975);
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 463-64,
rehearing denied, 415 U.S. 952 (1974); Calhoon v. Harvey, 379 U.S. 134, 140-41 (1964).
84. Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 337 (1975).
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federally created right often lacking a directly comparable state
cause of action. 85 State remedies appear to be inadequate, especially
in the discrimination field, and a private right of action has been
implied under the federal statute. 88 However, the federal remedy
exists only where it is necessary to vindicate federal rights;8 7 thus,
claims like Mrs. Mason's in Mason v. Belieu, "which lie outside the
major aim of the Act," 88 are relegated to other remedies, whether
expressly provided for in the statute or arising under traditional
common law principles.8 9
In contrast, the existence of obvious remedies for breach of
contract and overcharging claims has been a major factor in the
court decisions refusing to imply a federal remedy. 9° The same
argument applies to cases alleging violation of the safety provisions
of the Act and a number of courts have reacted accordingly. 91 The
words of the Third Circuit in Rauch are particularly telling:
[Plaintiffs'] claim ... to recover ... the cost of repairing their
altimeter . . .is the type of situation with which the common
and statutory law of the states deals every day. Whether their
claim is based on liability for breach of a warranty of
merchantability and fitness or on negligence or strict liability in
tort, all of which they allege, the state law has been traditionally
available to an injured party to obtain a remedy. In such a
controversy as this the fact that it was the Administrator's
regulations which, in the interest of air safety, prohibited the use
of the altimeter unless properly repaired is peripheral and not a
basic element of the claim. Accordingly this fact does not
transform what is an ordinary claim to recover the cost of
repairs made necessary by the defendants' derelictions, whether
contractual or tortious, into some species of suit to enforce air
safety regulations. It is clear to us that application of the fourth
Cort v. Ash factor furnishes no support for the plaintiffs'
92
position.

85. See Fitzgerald v. Pan Am.World Airlines, 229 F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1956).
86. See id. See also Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 338 (3d
Cir. 1975).
87. Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airlines, 229 F.2d 499, 502 (2d Cir. 1956).
88. 543 F.2d at 221. See notes 23-25 and accompanying text supra.
89. 543 F.2d at 221.
90. See Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F.2d 134, 138 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332,
337-38 (3d Cir. 1975).
91. See Rosdail v. Western Aviation, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 681, 683-84 (D. Colo. 1969);
Moungey v. Brandt, 250 F. Supp. 445, 451 (W.D. Wis. 1966); Moody v. McDaniel, 190 F.
Supp. 24, 28 (N.D. Miss. 1960).
92. 548 F.2d at 459-60 (footnotes omitted).
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In short, the question is simply the degree of federal interest in
the matter, which depends on the extent to which the matter is
"essentially of local concern. ' 93 The federal courts are courts of
limited jurisdiction and are already overloaded; certainly there
appears to be no good reason to add whole areas to their jurisdiction
without carefully considering the need to do so.94 Under the
circumstances, the importance of the fourth Cort factor should not be
underestimated.
III. APPLYING THE Cort CRITERIA IN THE FUTURE:
THERE IS A BETTER WAY

This short summary of the existing Federal Aviation Act cases
suggests that no problem arises in applying the Cort criteria when
all or most of the factors point, to the degree that they point at all, in
the same direction. Thus, under an act whose legislative history is
almost devoid of any indication of congressional intent, the focus
has been largely on the first and fourth of the factors. In the
discrimination and bumping cases, these factors combine to call for
a federal remedy;9 5 in the nonaccident safety area they combine to
call for its denial s 6 Even in the area of incidental discomfort from
the violation of tariff regulations, where state remedies may or may
not be adequate, 97 the statutory provisions relied upon by the
plaintiffs do not seem to have been enacted for their special benefit, 98
and, moreover, a private federal remedy may well be inconsistent
with the statute's regulatory scheme. 99
However, in the area of the rights of actual accident victims,
there is a direct conflict between the clear availability of adequate

93. Miree v. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25, 33 (1977), quoting Bank of America
Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29, 33-34 (1956).
94. See Merriam v. Kunzig, 476 F.2d 1233, 1250 (3d Cir. 1973) (Adams, J.,
dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
95. See, e.g., Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 512 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 426 U.S. 290 (1976); Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airlines, Inc., 229
F.2d 499 (2d Cir 1956).
96. See, e.g., Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452 (3d Cir. 1976).
97. See, e.g., Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215, 221-22 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
98. See, e.g., Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332 (3d
Cir. 1975).
99. See Wolf v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 544 F.2d 134 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 915 (1977); Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1975).
In both Wolf and Polansky, the Third Circuit concluded that the implication of a
private remedy would not be consistent with the Act's policy of promoting efficient air
service at reasonable charges without unjust discrimination, undue preferences, or
unfair competition. 544 F.2d at 138; 523 F.2d at 336-37.
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state remedies'00 and the equally clear - at least to most courts intent of Congress to benefit especially the passengers and crew who
would be endangered by the violation of air safety regulations. 10 1
The result, not unpredictably, has been an enduring conflict in the
02
case holdings.
The application of the four Cort factors has resulted in confusion
in the difficult cases partially because the implication of a cause of
action from a silent or ambiguous federal statute is not a question of
"discovering" congressional intent any more than the development
of the common law was a matter of "discovering" the true meaning
of existing precedent. Moreover, whereas the second and third Cort
factors are addressed solely to the question of whether Congress
intended to create a private cause of action, the first and fourth
factors help to answer not only that question but the related
questions of whether a court should, as a matter of policy, imply a
private cause of action and for whom. Unfortunately, since all of
these questions must be answered by the application of one or more
of the Cort factors, the federal courts have failed to recognize the
existence of separate questions and have tended simply to apply the
Cort factors without further analysis.
Accordingly, it is suggested that in order to avoid confusion in
applying the Cort factors, a court should address itself separately to
each of three questions. The first is the traditional question of
whether Congress intended to create a federal cause of action. The
second question - which courts are loathe to admit asking - is
whether, assuming apparent congressional neutrality on the first
question, the court itself should imply a federal cause of action.
Finally, if either of the first two questions is answered in the
affirmative, the court must determine whether the particular
plaintiff involved falls within the class of persons entitled to benefit
from the implied cause of action.
A. Did Congress Intend to Create a Federal
Cause of Action?
This is the question, explicitly faced in Cort, for which the
Supreme Court formulated its four-factor test.1°3 It is most akin to
the second Cort factor, although the other three factors may be

100.
101.
102.
103.

See
See
See
See

note 87 and accompanying text supra.
notes 39-40 and accompanying text supra.
note 41 and accompanying text supra.
text accompanying note 9 supra.
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helpful in answering it, particularly when the legislative history is
ambiguous.
To a court seeking to determine the existence of a private cause
of action, an actual expression of congressional intent is crucial.
Plainly, if Congress stated in explicit terms that a federal remedy
was created or denied, the federal court would need to go no further
in its investigation. Similarly, if the legislative history makes it clear
that Congress intended to create or deny a federal remedy, this
should come close to answering the question; it is only because
legislative history seldom speaks with the clarity of statutory
language that the court should look to the other three Cort factors to
corroborate its judgment.
On the other hand, it is difficult for any court to hold that
Congress specifically intended to create a private cause of action on
the basis of a statute whose legislative history does not indicate that
the issue was ever considered by that body and whose statutory
language makes no reference to a private remedy. Accordingly, it is
suggested that, to the degree that a court attributes to congressional
intention the creation of an implied federal right of action, there
should be at least enough legislative history to indicate that
Congress was aware of the possibility that it was creating a cause of
action and did not act to negate that possibility. Thereafter, the
considerations involved in the first, third and fourth Cort factors are
likely to be helpful in determining whether or not it is fair to impute
to the Congress the intention of creating an implied federal cause of
action.
B. If It Is Impossible to Determine Whether Congress Intended
to Create an Implied Federal Cause of Action, Should the
Federal Court Nevertheless Hold That Such a Cause of
Action Exists?
This question will normally be asked when there is little or no
evidence that Congress actually considered whether it was creating
an implied federal cause of action. The question tends to relate most
closely to the fourth Cort factor, although each of the other factors is
likely to have some bearing on its answer.
It could be argued that a sufficient answer to this question is
implicit from the facts that the federal courts are overburdened with
litigation and that their jurisdiction is limited to that created by
statute, 0 4 and that there should be a universal rule against the
104. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 673 (1950); McCord
v. Dixie Aviation Corp., 450 F.2d 1129, 1131 (10th Cir. 1971).
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creation of implied causes of action absent evidence of congressional
intent.105
We suggest, however, that there are occasions on which it is
appropriate for the federal courts to create a federal common law
right of action even when it is hard to say that Congress intended
this result. But these occasions are rare and limited in number, and
we submit that they arise only when there is a clear federal right to
be vindicated and an absence of any adequate state cause of action
to vindicate that right.106 In other words, the court should create a
federal common law right of action only when the second and third
Cort factors are neutral and the first and fourth factors plainly point
to the creation of such a right.
C. Assuming the Existence of an Implied Federal Cause
of Action, Does the Plaintiff Fall Within the Class
of Persons Entitled to Benefit From It?
This consideration is largely independent of those involved in
the first and second questions. Nevertheless, an affirmative answer
to it is vital to the existence of an implied federal cause of action. In
answering this question, the analysis of the court should normally
center on a reevaluation of the considerations involved in the first
10 7
Cort factor to the exclusion of the other three.
IV.

CONCLUSION

We believe that the method of analysis described above was
foreshadowed by the Third Circuit's decision in Rauch. The Rauch
court discussed only the first and fourth Cort factors in satisfying
itself that there was no implied federal cause of action for the
particular plaintiffs involved in that case, 10 8 and it did so in terms
more applicable to the second and third questions posed above than

105. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 874A, Comment h at 79-80 (Tent.
Draft No. 22, 1976).
106. Indeed, under these circumstances, the federal court may well conclude that
whether or not Congress considered the existence of a private remedy, that remedy is
needed to carry out the statutory purpose. This approach is similar to the position

adopted in the Restatement of Torts (Second), which recognized that in implying a
tort remedy under a statute, a court often is exercising its discretion and cautioned
against hiding behind the "smoke screen" of legislative intent. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 874A, Comment e at 74-75 (Tent. Draft No. 22, 1976).

107. See, e.g., Rauch v. United Instruments, Inc., 548 F.2d 452, 457-58 (3d Cir.
1976); Mason v. Belieu, 543 F.2d 215, 219-20 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 852
(1976).
108. 548 F.2d at 456-60.
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to the first.10 9 Thus, the analysis of the first Cort factor plainly
centered not on the question of whether Congress had created a
federal right to safe air passage in favor of some plaintiff, but of
whether, assuming such a right,110 the plaintiff aircraft owners and
operators were the persons for whose benefit that right had been
At the same time, the analysis of the fourth Cort factor
created.'
stressed the availability of simple, commonly used state law
alternatives to a federal cause of action in terms which indicated
that the court found it unnecessary to opt for the creation of a new
cause of action.112
We hope that the analytical framework suggested in this article
may help to clarify the application of the Cort criteria, resulting in
better reasoned and more consistent determinations regarding the
availability of an implied federal cause of action through a
recognition of the separate questions which may be involved in the
application of the Cort factors to any particular case.
109. Id. Indeed, the discussion of the first Cort factor concluded with a
determination not that there is no class subject to the special protection of the Act, but
that the special class is "the occupants of aircraft in flight" rather than the plaintiff
"aircraft owners." 548 F.2d at 459. Similarly, if less explicitly, the discussion of the
fourth Cort factor addressed only the need for a private federal cause of action rather
than the intention of Congress to create such a cause of action. See 548 F.2d at
459-60.
110. Id. at 457-58 n.10.
111. Id. at 457-58.
112. Id. at 459-60. As a practical matter, having determined that the first and
fourth Cort factors so plainly pointed to the absence of a federal cause of action, the
Rauch court found it unnecessary to consider the other two factors concerning
legislative intent and consistency with the legislative scheme. Id. at 460. As the
textual analysis above suggests, the determination that the plaintiffs in Rauch were
barred by the first factor should have been dispositive. Had the court made a contrary
determination that the plaintiffs before it were within the protected class, the analysis
of whether an implied federal cause of action had been created should have begun
with the question of legislative intent rather than that of the availability of adequate
state remedies. But see text accompanying notes 63-65 & 81, infra, indicating that
there is little if any basis for determining that Congress intended to create a private
cause of action to enforce the safety provisions of the Act.
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